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Abstract  
The recent financial crisis highlighted the importance of risk disclosures for investors and 
the wider society. We examined changes in risk disclosures in three UK-based 
construction companies before, during and after the financial crisis. The findings suggest 
that a crisis motivates a rise in the volume and quality of information provided by 
companies, while during periods of stability, companies generally provide less 
information and the quality of information is generic and repetitive in nature. Based on 
our research, a crisis enhances the overall volume of disclosures and this level of 
disclosure is maintained after the crisis, while any improvements in the quality of risk 
information are temporary. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 drew attention to the failure of corporate 
governance and financial reporting to provide relevant and reliable information about 
corporate performance and management of risks (Omberg, 2012; Quon et al, 2012; 
Boorman, 2009; Zalewska, 2014; Pinnuck, 2012; Goldin and Vogel, 2010; Souto, 2009; 
Riaz, 2009; De Bondt, 2010). The demand for greater transparency and high-quality 
narrative reporting in the aftermath of the financial crisis led to the introduction of new 
regulations and recommendations on risk disclosure. The main aim of these instruments 
was to enhance transparency and relevance of disclosed information because the 
awareness of company-specific risks and accuracy of market value are crucial factors for 
analysts, investors and professionals (Abraham and Shrives, 2014; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004). Mia and Al-Mamun (2011) note that companies increased risk disclosures over 
the period of the financial crisis, but the focus of these disclosures was more on increasing 
the amount of information rather than the quality of content. Despite the demand for 
greater transparency and high-quality narrative reporting, communication in annual 
reports has been viewed as a changeless area of “a major intellectual and logistical 
challenge” (ASB, 2009). Narrative statements often include boilerplate and generic 
disclosures rather than forward-looking, informative and specific content that would 
reduce the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Hassanein and 
Hussainey, 2015; Merkley, 2014; Li, 2010).  
Prior literature suggests that an increase in the level of informative disclosure can add 
value to the company and contribute to a higher share price (Einhorn, 2007; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Merkley, 2014). By increasing communication with stakeholders, 
companies facilitate confidence about their performance and risk practices, which, in turn, 
can lead to a lower cost of capital and market stability (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; 
 
 
Armitage and Marston, 2008). Moreover, creating a positive social impression can be one 
of the incentives to increase voluntary disclosure (Sutantoputra, 2009). Voluntary 
disclosures can hence have a beneficial impact on company reputation as well as attract 
new shareholders and, consequently, increase market liquidity. 
Although corporate disclosure can bring benefits to companies, it also carries costs and 
may have a negative impact on competitive advantage (Hill and Short, 2009). As 
emphasised by ICAEW (2010), “Transparency in business reporting is significantly 
constrained by considerations of cost, competition, confidentiality and litigation”. Haji 
and Mohd Ghazali (2012) specify that companies reduce corporate disclosure due to the 
preparation costs, sensitive information that may benefit competitors, and potential 
damage arising from disclosing unfavourable information. ICAEW (2011) has recognised 
that the costs of preparing disclosures may exceed the potential advantages; therefore, 
this can promote the disclosure of generic and uniform statements which do not meet the 
needs of investors and other stakeholders. Moreover, as suggested by proprietary cost 
theory, businesses may be more concentrated on demonstrating their positive aspects 
rather than disclosing their risks (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014).  
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate risk disclosures in three main ways. 
First, it provides a longitudinal analysis of changes in risk disclosures during a period of 
financial instability in 2006-2009 in order to examine the extent of risk disclosures before, 
during and after the crisis. The selected time span provides an opportunity to explore risk 
disclosure and risk transparency in different performance environments because of the 
turbulence created by the global financial crisis in the economy and corporate 
performance. Second, our study sheds light on the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate risk disclosure. The study focuses on the interaction between 
the size and independence of boards and risk disclosure. Third, our study provides insight 
 
 
on risk reporting in the UK construction industry which was severely affected by the 
financial crisis, but has not been studied to the same extent as other industries. Most prior 
studies have investigated the impact of the financial crisis on the banking sector (Barakat 
and Hussainey, 2013; Elbannan and Elbannan, 2015; Hassan, 2014; Xifra and Ordeix, 
2009). Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between 
turbulence in the external environment, financial performance and corporate risk 
disclosure. In doing so, it enhances understanding of the relevance and transparency of 
narrative risk disclosures in response to investor calls to receive more material and 
forward-looking information about corporate risks.  
 
2. Conceptual framework and hypothesis development 
Prominent corporate failures have increased public criticism of corporate governance 
controls (Bozec and Dia, 2015) and have led to a growing interest in the disclosure of risk 
in both academia and professional practice. The lack of adequate quantity and quality of 
risk reporting can be considered as one of the major weaknesses in accounting (Cabedo 
and Tirado, 2004). Being primarily voluntary, the disclosure of risks is arguably highly 
subjective. In the absence of mandatory regulations, risk disclosure can vary widely in 
relation to its content as well as presentation format (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Campbell and Slack, 2008). Substantial prior literature exists on corporate disclosure 
investigating the quantity and quality of disclosure in corporate annual reporting (Li, 
2010; Lee et al, 2003; Iatridis, 2011; Ryan, 2011; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). There is however insufficient empirical evidence on risk disclosure over 
the period of before, during and after the global financial crisis (Abraham et al, 2012; 
ASB 2009). Also, previous studies on corporate disclosure have limitations related to the 
use of cross-sectional analysis (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Chen and Roberts, 2010; 
Oliveira et al, 2011) and being descriptive in nature (ASB, 2009). 
 
 
 
2.1 Risk disclosures and the global financial crisis 
In the context of the global financial crisis, the majority of previous studies have focused 
on the analysis of financial firms (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Ismail and Rahman, 
2011; Simplice, 2011; Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015; Elbannan and Elbannan, 2015; 
Maffey et al, 2014; Hassan, 2014; Xifra and Ordeix, 2009; Moumen et al, 2015). The 
findings of these studies are mixed. On the one hand, researchers have found no change 
in corporate disclosure practice during or after the financial crisis. For example, Maffey 
et al (2014) investigated the risk disclosures of 66 Italian banks in 2011 arguing that this 
year represents a time period when banks should have paid greater attention to the level 
of disclosure, but the authors found no evidence of enhanced disclosure practice. 
Similarly, Simplice (2011) found that risk management disclosures did not provide any 
relevant data in the post-crisis year of 2008. In contrast, Ismail and Rahman (2011) 
provided evidence that risk management disclosures in Malaysian banks improved 
significantly between 2006 and 2009, rising from 83.82% in 2006 to 91.67% in 2009. 
This finding suggests that the global financial crisis resulted in a more careful focus on 
risk assessment and therefore contributed to a rise in the level of risk reporting. The 
findings by Moumen et al (2015) provide evidence on the usefulness of risk disclosure in 
corporate reporting through establishing a positive relation between risk-related 
information and the market ability to forecast future earnings changes. 
Whilst a significant branch of research has focused on the banking industry, other authors 
have examined risk reporting practices in non-financial companies during the financial 
crisis, intentionally excluding the financial sector due to its special disclosure regulations 
(Ntim et al, 2013; Haji and Mohd Ghazali, 2012; Probohudono et al, 2013; Wang et al, 
2013; Abraham and Shrives, 2014; Greco, 2012; Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez, 
 
 
2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Al Zoubi and Al Zoubi, 2012). In order to investigate 
the impact of the financial crisis on different categories of risk disclosure, Probohudono 
et al (2013) focused their research on manufacturing companies in South East Asia. 
Aiming to understand the degree of predictor factors in risk communication in 2007-2009, 
the research revealed an average disclosure level of 28.61% for the three year period. The 
lowest level of disclosure was attributed to 2007 for all risk categories, whereas business 
and credit risks experienced a high level of disclosure in 2009. In terms of allocation 
amongst different categories of risks, business risk was accountable for the highest level 
of disclosure over time (41.81%), whereas strategic risk amounted to the lowest 
proportion (12.50%). Among significant studies is also Ntim et al (2013) who examined 
the interdependence between corporate governance and risk disclosure over the period of 
2002-2011 in South Africa. The authors concluded that risk disclosure experienced a 
general improvement over ten years. With regard to the financial crisis, the results showed 
no support for a significant difference between risk disclosure before and after the crisis 
period of 2007-2008.  
-----Table 1----- 
 
2.2 Company specific disclosures as a strategic tool 
A number of previous studies have established a positive relationship between the volume 
of disclosure and profitability. For example, based on a cross-sectional study, Al-Najjar 
and Abed (2014) found a statistically significant relationship between the quantity of 
corporate disclosure and corporate performance. Similarly, examining a sample of 
Egyptian banks in 2002-2011, Elbannan and Elbannan (2015) found that the market share 
and profitability was higher in those banks with higher levels of risk disclosure, which 
can be explained by considering disclosure as a signal for a lower level of risk in these 
 
 
banks. Previous studies have also suggested that large organisations provide more risk 
information in comparison to smaller companies (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).  
We propose that during a period of crisis, the positive relationship observed in prior 
studies between profitability and the volume of corporate disclosure does not hold. 
Instead, the volume of risk disclosures increases as the financial situation of the company 
weakens. As suggested by earlier research studying the impact of the financial crisis on 
corporate disclosure, companies increased their levels of corporate disclosure after the 
global financial crisis in order to influence the way in which they were being viewed in 
society and to reduce the negative effects caused by the crisis (Elzahar and Hussainey, 
2012; Haji and Mohd Ghazali, 2012). Based on this reasoning, the following proposition 
can be developed:  
P1.  The volume of company-specific disclosures increases in the aftermath of a 
financial crisis.  
 
2.3 Leverage and the level of risk disclosure  
The level of leverage is another important factor that may contribute to the volume and 
quality of risk communication in annual reports. As the level of debt increases, the 
demand for additional information about the company’s ability to satisfy its financial 
obligations also increases (Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez, 2014). It can be expected 
that an increase in risk disclosure serves as a justification and explanation of the 
unfavourable conditions within the company and how they are being addressed (Amran 
et al, 2009). From this follows that the second proposition can be formulated as the 
positive relationship between leverage and disclosure:  
P2.  Levels of leverage are positively associated with the volume of company-
specific disclosures. 
 
 
 
2.4 Quality and specificity of disclosure 
Prior studies suggest that companies tend to provide vague rather than substantive and 
company specific information about risks. Abraham and Shrives (2014) argued that 
companies disclose symbolic risk information which is limited or have no “relation to the 
actual risks faced by companies” due to proprietary costs and institutional factors. 
Similarly, Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez (2014) found that most Spanish companies 
provide vague risk information and the largest companies specifically avoid detailed 
disclosure due to the possible negative effects of such disclosure for competitive 
advantage. At the same time, researchers have argued that companies with poor 
performance provide investors with more informative and higher quality disclosures than 
well-performing companies (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015).  
We propose that the quality of information provided by companies facing a decline in 
profitability or generally weak performance is more detailed and related to the company 
and its particular circumstances. In our research, we explore the nature of disclosure 
statements during the financial crisis to shed light on the use of risk disclosure as a 
strategic tool that may serve as a method to improve communication and raise trust with 
stakeholders in the context of a crisis and fluctuating financial performance. We expect 
to see an increase in the quality of disclosures through an increase in the company-specific 
information provided by the companies as the financial situation worsens. We propose 
that companies disclose more information about their risks and related management 
practices for the purpose of sustaining investor confidence. 
P3.   The quality of corporate disclosures becomes more specific during a period of 
crisis.  
 
 
 
2.5 Risk disclosure and time orientation 
The predictability of risks in advance of significant events is arguably one of the key 
drivers underpinning calls for increased risk disclosures as discussed by Solomon (2013). 
However, companies prevalently provide information about past and present risks, 
avoiding the provision of forward-looking risk information (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
There is some evidence to suggest that there are companies that provide more future 
orientated than backward looking information (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Overall, 
however, earlier research has found that most corporate reports comprise back-forward 
information which facilitates the reduction of exposure to litigation, whilst representing 
little usefulness for investors due to generic statements that lack comparability and 
transparency (Oliveira et al, 2011). Abraham et al (2012) found in their study that a mere 
16% of narrative disclosures was future-related. Similarly, a study conducted by Abraham 
and Shrives (2014) showed that events are discussed in annual reports after they occur 
rather than before they take place. As a result, the authors recommend that shareholders 
should question the disclosure of vague and routinely repeated information in annual 
reports. Investors should call for reliable, relevant and forward-looking risk disclosure. 
We propose that companies increase the provision of forward looking information during 
a financial crisis in order to enhance trust among the investor community about the 
company’s ability to manage the situation: 
P4.  Companies provide more future-oriented disclosures during a period of crisis.  
 
2.6 Links to corporate governance 
Being an essential “mechanism for addressing agency problems and controlling the firm’s 
risk-taking”, focus on corporate governance has been one of the responses to the financial 
 
 
crisis (Tarraf and Majeske, 2013). The quantity and quality of risk-related information in 
annual reports in relation to the corporate governance mechanisms is an area of significant 
research interest (Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014; Oliveira et al, 2011; Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Lim et al, 2007; Lajili, 2009; Solomon et al, 
2000; Bonaci et al, 2012). The most widely used corporate governance factors include: 
company size, board size and board independence. Even though corporate governance 
variables generally change over a relatively long time period, the financial crisis may 
have presented a sudden shock that led companies to redesign their corporate governance 
structures including the size and nature of the board. In what follows, we discuss three 
corporate governance factors: company size, board size, and board independence. 
2.6.1 Company Size  
A large number of studies have investigated the impact of company size on corporate 
governance and disclosure (Probohudono et al, 2013; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004; Amran et al, 2009; Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014). It has been argued 
that larger companies provide a higher volume of disclosures because of the importance 
of communicating effectively with a large pool of stakeholders (Amran et al, 2009). Also, 
they are better able to cover the costs of voluntary disclosure due to their better financial 
resources (Probohudono et al, 2013). Larger companies also rely on external finance, 
which requires better communication of risks to investors (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). 
The level of political visibility of large companies is another factor that is likely to 
enhance disclosure in larger companies to reduce the costs of being perceived as 
ambiguous (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015). In contrast, Watson et al (2002) argue that 
the costs of disclosing voluntary information can be high or even unaffordable for small 
companies. Thus, we expect the size of the company to be related to the level of risk 
disclosure and propose that company size is likely to influence the level of the disclosure 
 
 
of risk information in annual reports. Therefore, the following proposition can be 
developed: 
P5.  The level of the disclosure of risk information in annual reports is related to 
company size.  
 
2.6.2 Board Size  
The importance of the board function and the potential consequences of its failure have 
been highlighted by the global financial crisis (Solomon, 2013). The board plays a 
significant role in setting an appropriate corporate governance practice (Brown et al, 
2009) and in controlling and disclosing strategic information (Mohd Hafiz et al, 2014). 
Abdullah and Page (2009) assert that it is larger boards with more experience and high 
managerial ownership and not corporate governance itself that leads to better monitoring 
of risks. Being responsible for defining and alleviating risks, boards may represent the 
potential source of corporate risks, for example, by a failure to understand the 
consequences of their strategic decisions. 
A number of prior studies have found that board size is positively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure because an increase in the board size is accompanied with a diversity 
of board members which leads to higher quality of corporate decisions and as a 
consequence the provision of high quality information (Ntim et al, 2013; Rodriguez 
Dominguez and Gamez, 2014). An optimally composed board provides the right balance 
in the combination of skills, level of expertise and professional judgment for enhancing 
the efficacy of the board. 
While size is positively related to the effectiveness of the board, large boards may become 
unwieldy and inefficient. Several previous studies suggest that large boards can lead to 
the reduction of governance efficacy. For example, Guest (2009) concluded on the basis 
 
 
of a large sample of companies that board size has a negative impact on firm performance 
because the effectiveness of a large board is restricted by lack of communication, control 
and decision-making. It is likely that large boards have a higher volume of internal dissent 
and more complexity in decision-making. As a result, large boards may be reluctant to 
reveal voluntary information about risks (Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez, 2014). 
Based on the above arguments, we formulated the following proposition: 
P6.  Board size is connected to the disclosure of risk in annual reports. 
 
2.6.3 Board Independence  
Board effectiveness has been connected to its degree of independence and 
recommendations exist on the independence of boards. According to the Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance, ‘at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should 
comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent’ (FRC, 
2003, p.7, section A.3.2). Independent directors have a favourable impact on the quality 
of decision-making because of their outside experience and their presence reduces agency 
conflicts. At the same time, independent directors may result in a diminished level of 
governance efficiency and effectiveness because outside directors may not have sufficient 
knowledge about the company to be able to scrutinise and contribute positively to the 
governance of the company (Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez, 2014).  
The majority of previous studies suggest a positive relationship between independent 
directors and corporate reporting showing the importance of independent boards for 
providing risk-related information. The presence of independent directors not only helps 
to improve communication of risk information and positively affects voluntary disclosure 
(Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004; Probohudono et al, 2013; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but it also performs the role of a key indicator of the 
 
 
effectiveness of corporate governance function (Solomon, 2013). Arguably, non-
executive, independent directors should increase the dissemination of information about 
corporate risks because they have fewer personal interests linked to the company which 
allows them to support the provision of risk information.  
An extensive study conducted by Abraham and Cox (2007) demonstrated the importance 
of independent directors because of the balance they bring to the board that enables the 
company to better meet shareholder expectations relating to accountability and 
transparency. Similarly, a study carried out by Lajili (2009) showed that Canadian 
companies provide more risk-related information if the majority of their board members 
are independent. Personal reputation of non-executive directors can be also one of the 
factors for more enhanced disclosure on risks as independent directors act as corporate 
outsiders with little involvement in daily operations (Oliveira et al, 2011). Finally, 
Barakat and Hussainey (2013) investigated bank governance, regulation and risk 
reporting in 85 EU banks in 2007-2008 and found that the quality of risk disclosure can 
be improved by the introduction of independent supervisors or by increasing the 
proportion of outside board directors. Therefore, board independence can be expected to 
explain changes in risk disclosure and the following proposition can be formulated: 
P7.  Board independence is connected to the disclosure of risks in annual reports. 
 
3. Data and methods  
3.1 Data and sample selection 
We adopted a longitudinal research design for studying changes in risk disclosure over a 
four year period from 2006 to 2009. As shown in Figure 1, the time period covers the 
global financial crisis (GFC) from before the crisis in 2006 to its aftermath in 2009, 
 
 
enabling the analysis of the volume and quality of risk disclosure against different levels 
of profitability and leverage as well as changes in corporate governance structures 
introduced in the period following the financial crisis. Even though the financial crisis 
can be seen as a unique event, it provides an opportunity to study the same set of 
companies in the context of varying levels of financial performance and corporate 
governance structures.   
-----Figure 1----- 
Three companies listed on the London Stock Exchange FTSE100 were selected for the 
study. Following Linsley and Shrives (2006), Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) and 
Abraham and Cox (2007), FTSE100 was used as a pool of companies for the study 
because larger companies were expected to provide more information about risks and 
therefore a richer source of data for exploring the research questions. The three companies 
– Barratt Developments plc, Persimmon plc, and Taylor Wimpey plc – operated in the 
construction sector and represented all the companies listed from this sector in FTSE100 
during the period of study. They shared a similar regulatory framework of risk disclosures 
with companies from other sectors with the exception of financial companies that had 
specific characteristics resulting from a different framework for disclosure practices 
(Beretta and Bozzolan 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). A list 
of the companies and their market capitalisation is given in Table 2. Representing one of 
the largest sectors within the UK economy, the construction industry is perceived to be 
exposed to complex risks due to the interconnections in construction projects. Gruenberg 
et al (2007) argue that because of the uniqueness of building projects, it is highly difficult 
to predict risks and the impact they may have on the company. However, larger 
companies tend to be more resilient to unexpected crisis conditions and, in contrast to 
small and medium companies, are less likely to face bankruptcy in the building sector. 
 
 
Therefore, because our sample consists of three large companies, the findings may not be 
generalisable to medium-sized companies or other industries. 
-----Table 2----- 
3.2 Dependent variable: risk disclosure  
Content analysis has been widely used in accounting research to measure corporate risk 
disclosure in annual reports (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Greco, 
2012; Hill and Short, 2009; Maffei et al, 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Najjar 
and Abed, 2014; Li, 2010). As a well-established method, content analysis is applied “for 
making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use” where 
reproducibility of findings plays an essential role (Krippendorff, 2004, p.18). In content 
analysis, words or other units of text are analysed in order to quantify or explore them 
against predetermined themes or categories. Coding units typically include sentences, 
paragraphs or words depending on the focus of the research (Bowman, 1984).  
In our research, the dataset included a total of 12 annual reports covering four fiscal years 
for three companies (2006-2009). Narrative information from the following sections of 
the annual reports was analysed: the Chairman’s statement, the Group Chief Executive’s 
statement, the Business and Financial reviews and the Director’s report. We extracted a 
total of 860 sentences from the annual reports and examined them as risk disclosure 
statements in order to identify possible themes and patterns.   
Adapting the risk disclosure index developed by Abraham and Shrives (2014), we 
extracted risk-related sentences from the annual reports and categorised them into two 
groups: 1) generic risk statements and 2) specific risk statements. Sentences were coded 
as risk disclosures if the reader was informed about threats or opportunities that had 
impacted or were going to impact the company or its environment. As suggested by 
 
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006), only risks that we explicitly stated were included in the pool 
of disclosure sentences; vague or implied statements were excluded from the analysis. 
This approach has been adopted in a number of risk disclosure studies using content 
analysis to investigate annual reports (e.g. Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012).     
Selecting sentences as the main unit of analysis is a common approach to disclosure 
measurement because of the reliability of sentences in comparison to the analysis of other 
textual units such as words and pages (Amran et al, 2009). Sentences enable a more 
accurate identification of relevant content than words because of the context provided by 
the sentence for interpreting the meaning of specific words and whether they constitute a 
risk disclosure. Recent studies in risk disclosures have adopted sentences as the primary 
coding unit (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006), although in 
some studies both sentences and words have been used to increase the reliability of the 
results (Abraham and Cox, 2007). However, the selection of sentences or words as the 
main unit of analysis is unlikely to have a material effect on the results (Milne and Adler, 
1999).  
3.3 Independent variables: financial measures  
Financial performance was studied using standard measures and sources as shown in 
Table 3. The measures were calculated for the three companies for each of the four 
financial years in order to study changes over the study period.   
-----Table 3----- 
3.4 Independent variables: corporate governance 
 
 
To explore the relationship between corporate governance factors and risk disclosure, 
three characteristics of corporate governance were collected and measured in line with 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012). Table 4 displays the measurements of the independent 
variables which are consistent with several past studies. First, as a measure of company 
size, total assets at the end of the fiscal year was used. Second, board size was measured 
as the total number of board members over the study period. Third, board independence 
was measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board.  
-----Table 4----- 
3.5 Market capitalisation  
The UK construction industry faced the hardest conditions because of the impact of the 
GFC showing the deepest annual decline in house prices and affecting the whole economy 
(Ball, 2010). It is worth noting though that “the UK construction industry’s performance 
following the 2008 slowdown was initially similar to that experienced in previous 
slowdowns” (Office for National Statistics, 2013). 
Market capitalisation, which can be considered as the most accurate measure of 
shareholder value, demonstrated a decreasing confidence between 2006 and 2008 years 
in the ability of the companies to survive the crisis period. Market capitalisation of Taylor 
Wimpey and Barratt Development decreased by 93.96% and 91.15% respectively, and 
the capitalisation of Persimmon dropped by 84.73% over the period (Figure 2). Given the 
hitting market conditions in 2008 and the collapsed value of the big construction 
companies, many financial analysts raised concerns forecasting a close breach of the 
banking agreements for companies including Persimmon, Barratt Developments and 
Taylor Wimpey (Treanor and Wearden, 2008). 
----- Figure 2----- 
 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Volume of disclosure 
When averaged across the three companies, the volume of risk related disclosures 
increased throughout the period studied from 2006 to 2009. As shown in Figure 3, the 
biggest increases in disclosures took place in 2007 and in 2008 after which the volume of 
disclosures appeared to stabilise. More specifically, the overall number of disclosures 
increased by 59.38% in 2007 and 98.04% in 2008. By 2009, the number of disclosures 
increased only slightly by 2% suggesting that a plateau had been reached. The financial 
crisis therefore saw an increase in the volume of risk disclosure that reflected the 
introduction of new recommendation by governments and accounting bodies.     
At company level, Barratt, with the lowest number of disclosures in 2006 in comparison 
to the other two companies, saw the highest increase in disclosures from a total of 17 
disclosures in 2006 to 144 in 2009 (747.06%). The other two companies, Taylor Wimpey 
and Persimmon, which both started with a higher volume of disclosures in 2006, saw a 
considerable, but a less steep increase in disclosures from 34 to 64 (88.24%) and from 46 
to 100 (117.40%) respectively. Overall, the analysis suggests that a larger volume of 
disclosures were made by all the companies with the largest increases seen with the 
companies starting from a lower base. 
There was a high degree of difference between the number of disclosures provided by the 
companies across the period of study. For example, in 2006, the number of disclosures 
varied from 17 to 46 and in 2009 from 64 to 144. One company, Taylor Wimpey, had the 
highest level of disclosures throughout the period of study except for 2009 when Barratt 
provided a higher number of disclosures. On average, the number of disclosures increased 
 
 
from 32 in 2006 to 102 in 2009 across the three companies. It will be argued later that the 
volume of disclosures provided by Taylor Wimpey through the study period may be 
connected to the company’s board composition.  
-----Figure 3----- 
The movements in the volume of risk disclosures corresponded to the movements in 
company profitability. As can be seen in Figure 4, when Return-on-Assets (ROA) as a 
measure of profitability experienced a downward trend, the volume of disclosures 
increased.  
----- Figure 4----- 
4.2 Quality of disclosure 
4.2.1 Generic versus company specific information 
Narrative risk disclosures were investigated with regard to their generic and specific 
nature. The analysis showed that generic information about risks increased throughout 
the period studied. In parallel, the provision of company specific information increased 
particularly in 2007 and 2008, but declined in 2009 when the financial crisis started to 
settle. The analysis of narrative information showed that Taylor Wimpey provided the 
most detailed and company specific information in comparison to the other companies. 
Overall, as shown in Figure 5, companies provided more generic than company specific 
information throughout the period under investigation. Also, the volume of generic and 
company specific disclosures did not always develop in the same way even though both 
increased over the period studied.  
-----Figure 5----- 
 
 
 
When basic risk characteristics and risk management policies were analysed separately, 
a relatively higher increase was seen in the discussion of basic risk characteristics. 
Information about risk management policies also grew but to a lesser degree, which 
suggests that the companies considered it more important to shed light on risks and how 
they were affecting the company rather than disclosure information about policies that 
had been used to deal with risk.  
The detailed examination of the narrative content of the annual reports shows that in 2006, 
there were no signs or caution about the possibility of future changes in the companies’ 
performance or market risks. For example, Barratt stated that its “record forward sales, 
strengthened land bank and strong finances’ provide ‘a healthy position for the coming 
year” (Barratt, 2006, p.14). At the same time, Persimmon stated its confidence about “the 
underlying strength of the housing market” and “ability to grow […] business over future 
years” (Persimmon, 2006, p.2). In a similar way, Taylor Wimpey showed an overall 
confidence in the future.  
In 2007, a year before the peak of the financial crisis, the annual reports demonstrated a 
degree of doubt and uncertainty, but the statements were generally vague. Moreover, the 
majority of information related to risk factors and internal control was largely copied from 
previous reports and only a small amount of new information was provided. In line with 
prior research (Abraham and Shrives, 2014), this repetitive information shows that 
companies do not provide a full update of their risks on an annual basis. The generic and 
repeated nature of the disclosed information in years 2006 and 2007 is an example of 
information provided during years of perceived stability.  
Only in the annual reports of 2008 when the economic, market and financial conditions 
were at their peak of turbulence did companies provide more specific and unique 
information in their statements. As acknowledged by Taylor Wimpey (2008, p. 28), “2008 
 
 
was the most challenging year that the housing market has encountered in recent history”. 
Moreover, 2008 was the only year when the reports included more new information than 
repeated content from previous years. However, in the following year in 2009, the 
disclosure of specific information about risks either decreased or stopped to rise in all 
three cases. 
Overall, narrative information in the annual reports was characterised by a low degree of 
comparability within and across companies. During periods of perceived stability in 2006 
and 2007, companies avoided disclosure about the uncertainties faced by them and the 
provision of company specific information. The period of crisis in 2008 provoked 
companies to offer more meaningful and specific information that communicated their 
risk profiles to the shareholders and other stakeholders. There are several possible 
explanations for this increase in the quality of information. For example, companies are 
more dependent on stakeholders, inflows of new investments, and corporate image during 
periods of crisis and therefore communicate more with their stakeholders. In summary, 
the harder the economic and financial conditions are, the more concrete and reliable 
narrative disclosure is. 
4.2.2 Forward orientation 
The majority of narrative reporting consisted of historical statements and descriptions 
about past events. The usefulness of such retrospective and backward orientated 
information is questionable in terms of its relevance for predicting significant events in 
the future. For example, the presentation of corporate risks disclosed in the annual reports 
before the financial crisis did not reflect subsequent financial performance. It was only in 
2008 that the reports included substantial information that was forward orientated. In this 
year, all three companies anticipated difficulties in the following year and discussed 
 
 
factual details about the possible risks and risk factors they might face. They also signaled 
caution about the speediness of recovery.  
As briefly discussed above, the risk statements included a substantial amount of copied 
data from previous annual reports. This repeated information may not necessarily reflect 
the actual risk situation a company is facing and it may therefore fail to provide 
stakeholders with relevant, current and useful information which is essential for making 
informed investment and other decisions. The tendency to generalization and symbolism 
in narrative reporting, particularly with regard to periods of stable profitability and 
leverage arrangements, appears to provide little new or valuable information to readers 
about current or future risks. Our analysis therefore suggests that annual reports provide 
little information about significant risks and other issues that enable investors to make 
informed decisions about the future.  
4.3 Leverage and disclosure 
Figure 6 illustrates the growth in debt usage in 2008 and 2009 in comparison to 2006 and 
2007. From the years included in the study, 2008 was the most critical year for all three 
companies when they took “tough decisions over the course of 2008 in the face of an 
unprecedented global economic backdrop” (Taylor Wimpey, 2008, p. 1).  
-----Figure 6----- 
The surge in the average borrowings in comparison to equity took place when the 
companies were not able to obtain equity finance through existing shareholders due to the 
extraordinary level of uncertainty in the economic and financial conditions which resulted 
in the rejection of financial support by large investors. As a result, the financial 
indebtedness required urgent actions by the three companies in terms of restructuring 
debts and finding measures for adapting to the extraordinary market conditions.  
 
 
Taking advantage of their big size, the three largest housebuilders undertook relatively 
similar measures for preventing failures, servicing debts, and slowly stabilising 
businesses at time of financial difficulty. For example, in 2008 Barratt Developments 
reached agreements with banks to refinance their loans of £400m, waived covenants on 
the rest of their debts of £1.7bn, and wrote down the value of their land bank by £85m 
(Russell and Monaghan, 2008). As for Taylor Wimpey, in order to avert a collapse and 
to cut its debt since a failed fund raising in 2008, they still managed to raise £510m via 
the fully underwritten share issue in 2009 and to refinance £2.5bn of the company debts 
which resolved uncertainty around company’s viability (Fildes, 2009). Similarly, 
Persimmon renegotiated the terms of their existing debt and acquired new banking 
facilities, bringing the total credit facilities to slightly more than £1bn with a burden to 
pay interest rates on the loan that were 75 per cent higher than before (Pearson and 
Fickling, 2009). Apart from measures taken on companies’ level, two factors played an 
important role in boosting the housing market: the governmental ‘NewBuy initiative’ 
provided “a guarantee to banks that offer 95 per cent mortgages” and “the Bank of 
England’s Funding for Lending Scheme”, which helped banks to introduce more 
affordable rates on loans (Plimmer and Wembridge, 2013). 
Although the new financing deals and the restructuring removed the immediate danger of 
going into bankruptcy, analysts warned that these actions could have significant 
drawbacks and inherited costs consisting in increased interest rates and more expensive 
debts which have to be paid back through asset sales (Russell and Monaghan, 2008). 
Another result of the higher debt-equity ratio related to structural reconsiderations with 
the outcome of closing divisions and reducing staff. For example, Barratt announced the 
redundancy of about 1200 people in 2008, Persimmon reduced its operational and 
 
 
administrative staff by 55%, and Taylor Wimpey launched similar redundancy 
programmes.  
----- Figure 7----- 
Regarding the relationship between leverage and corporate disclosure, the level of 
leverage corresponded to the volume of company specific risk disclosure. Figure 7 
portrays that company specific risk disclosures increased as leverage rose in 2007. Risk 
disclosures also increased in 2008 as leverage rose further, but when the level of debt 
declined in 2009, the volume of disclosures also fell. The analysis therefore suggests that 
when companies are perceived to be close to financial distress and bankruptcy, company 
leadership may decide to mitigate this situation through increasing the level of 
communication with shareholders and the financial community. This finding is in line 
with prior research by Mia and Al-Mamun (2011).  
4.4 Links to corporate governance 
4.4.1 Company size and disclosure 
Table 5 indicates that Barratt’s and Taylor Wimpey’s total assets, as a measure of 
company size, almost doubled between 2006 and 2007 mainly due to a rise in inventories, 
intangible assets, goodwill, investments and swaps. Persimmon’s size of total assets 
showed a similar upward trend in 2007, albeit less steep. Afterwards, there was a steady 
decrease in the company size for all the three companies in 2008 and a further drop in 
2009 because of a diminished level of inventories, receivables and goodwill impairments. 
-----Table 5----- 
When comparing average company size from 2006 to 2009 with the number of total and 
specific risk disclosures, it can be stated that the increase in the provision of company 
 
 
specific as well as total disclosures in 2007 reflected a substantial rise of company size in 
the same year. Meanwhile, a significant decline of the average company size in 2008-
2009 corresponded to a decrease in the provision of company specific information in 
2009. 
4.4.2 Board size  
-----Figure 8----- 
The analysis reveals that the lowest number of board directors was registered in 2007 in 
all the three companies (Figure 8). By the end of the study period in 2008, all the three 
companies had 10 board members. Overall, the number of board members changed 
almost on an annual basis and fluctuated between 7 and 11 members. Because of the 
relatively small number of board members and the constant fluctuation in numbers, no 
generalisation can be made in relation to risk disclosure.  
4.4.3 Board independence  
As shown in Figure 9, the average level of independent directors rose from 61% in 2006 
to 63% in 2009. All the companies were in compliance with the Corporate Governance 
Code by maintaining a level of independent directors at 50% or higher. The lowest 
proportion of independent directors was attributed to 2007 for all the three companies, 
while the highest percentage manifested itself in 2008. These trends can be explained by 
the actions taken by the companies in response to the financial crisis and for stabilising 
their financial position and governance. 
The analysis also provides support for the argument that there is a relationship between 
the level of specific disclosures and the proportion of independent directors. For example, 
in 2008, Taylor Wimpey had the highest percentage of independent directors (75%). In 
 
 
this year, it also had the highest number of total and specific disclosures amongst all the 
three companies. In previous literature, it has been argued that independent directors 
facilitate the provision of information about risks and therefore improve the quality of 
disclosed information (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).  
-----Figure 9----- 
Overall, the size of the board did not change significantly in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, but it fluctuated throughout the period studied. In contrast, the boards of the three 
companies saw an increase in the number of independent directors immediately after the 
crisis. The findings therefore demonstrate that companies can react quickly by increasing 
the number of independent directors that has been previously associated with the volume 
of risk-related information made available by companies (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; 
Lajili, 2009). As suggested by Oliveira et al (2011), the personal reputation of 
independent directors may help companies to enhance their reputation in an uncertain and 
volatile environment. 
 
5. Discussion of findings 
The global financial crisis highlighted the growing demand for relevant and reliable 
information about risks by corporate stakeholders including investors, regulatory 
authorities and governments. The present study set out with the aim of exploring 
corporate disclosure practices among UK construction companies over the period of 
2006-2009. Applying content analysis to the annual reports of the three companies, we 
investigated the volume and quality of risk disclosure over the period of study. In 
addition, we examined the extent to which corporate governance factors were associated 
with changes in corporate disclosure. The findings of the study contribute to literature in 
 
 
corporate disclosure by investigating how disclosure practices vary between a relatively 
stable time and a period of crisis.  
5.1 Disclosures 
Our findings provide support for earlier research showing that risk disclosures increased 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Haji and Mohd 
Ghazali, 2012). Our analysis showed that the volume of risk disclosures increased 
throughout the period of 2006-2009 but seemed to reach a plateau after the financial crisis 
had peaked in 2008. The largest increases in the volume of disclosures were seen in the 
company that started from the lowest base. The financial crisis therefore saw an increase 
in the volume of risk disclosure and particularly in those companies that provided 
relatively little information before the crisis.  
Overall, companies provided more generic than company specific information throughout 
the period under investigation. The generic and repeated nature of the disclosed 
information in years 2006 and 2007 supports previous research findings about the general 
and symbolic nature of risk disclosure (Abraham and Shrives, 2014). Similarly, the 
repeated content of disclosure statements suggests that companies do not provide fully 
new and updated information on an annual basis. However, our findings add to the 
existing literature by showing that during a period of crisis, not only the volume, but the 
quality of corporate risk disclosure improves. This finding is supported by the observation 
that the provision of company-specific information decreased or remained at the same 
level in 2009 once the economy began to recover after the crisis. However, the companies 
considered it more important to shed light on risks and how they were affecting the 
company rather than disclosure information about policies that had been used to deal with 
risk. The increase in the quality of disclosures in times of crisis can be considered as a 
 
 
measure taken by the companies to communicate with their investors and to improve 
confidence in the company among shareholders.  
The findings of our study further suggest that the majority of data in narratives consists 
of historical statements and descriptions about past events, questioning the usefulness of 
such post-factum and backward-oriented information for its relevance for predicting 
future events. The companies were reluctant to provide new information and their 
disclosures were dominated by information copied from previous reports. Overall, our 
analysis suggests that annual reports provide little information about significant risks and 
other issues that enable investors to make informed decisions about the future. These 
findings support prior research according to which companies are reluctant to provide 
forward-looking information (Abraham et al, 2012; Abraham and Shrives, 2014; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004). Our findings add to the existing literature by showing that crisis 
periods may provoke companies to provide more forward oriented information, but this 
change is temporary.    
It has been argued that rising level of debts and financial distress have the effect of 
spurring the number of risk-related statements in annual reports (Rodriguez Dominguez 
and Gamez, 2014). Our results support these prior findings and show that the companies 
studied suffered from a detrimental stock market value in 2007 and 2008 when the 
financial performance and position in all three cases demonstrated significant leverage 
risks and this corresponded to an increase of risk disclosures by the companies. Based on 
this, it can be suggested that when companies are close to financial distress and 
bankruptcy, they seek to mitigate these situations by increasing the level of 
communication with stakeholders.  
5.2 Corporate governance and disclosure 
 
 
Our examination of the relationship between company size and disclosure of risk 
information supports the findings of previous studies by showing that the size of the 
company influences its ability and willingness to communicate about risk (Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014; Amran et al, 2009). Our findings suggest 
that the increase in the provision of company specific and total disclosures in 2007 
reflected a substantial rise in average company size in 2007. This connection may be 
explained by the larger pool of stakeholders that larger companies have and the related 
interest in receiving communication about risks, particularly during a period of instability.  
We were not able to make conclusions about the interdependence between board size and 
the volume of risk disclosure because of the limited data set. There are external factors 
that can influence changes in board composition particularly in the period of financial 
distress that may have caused the observed fluctuations in the size of boards. Also, a 
larger set of companies is needed for investigating this relationship.  
Our analysis suggests that the level of total and company specific disclosures may 
correspond to the proportion of independent directors. This finding supports previous 
studies that have identified board independence as an important variable explaining 
changes in corporate disclosure (Oliveira et al, 2011; Ntim et al, 2013). One of the 
possible explanations for this relationship is that non-executive independent directors are 
more motivated to increase voluntary disclosure levels due to having fewer personal 
interests and for maintaining reputational capital (Probohudono et al, 2013). 
Future research is needed to examine the relationship between corporate disclosure and 
corporate governance factors based on a larger sample of companies from different non-
financial industries. Extending the end period of study from 2009 year to 2011 and beyond 
would allow to examine more fundamentally changes in corporate disclosure before, 
during and after the global financial crisis. Future research may also wish to consider the 
 
 
disclosure patterns before, during and after the GFC by the medium-sized companies, 
including statistics about their survival mechanisms to overcome financial distress. It 
would also be interesting to see research on the proportion of new information in annual 
reports in contrast to copied data from previous reports.  
5.3 Managerial and regulation implications 
Regarding managerial and policy implications of our findings, stakeholders rely on the 
annual reports as the main source of receiving relevant and comparable information about 
risks and opportunities, whereas disclosures can be constrained as companies may prefer 
to limit their narratives because of the costs, agency conflicts, and potential damage to 
competitive advantage. The voluntary nature of corporate disclosure can be associated 
with a lack of transparency and meaningfulness of the communication between 
companies and their shareholders, despite the attempts to enhance regulation and to 
increase reliability of narrative reporting. Our findings suggest that an increase in the 
amount of disclosure may not be indicative of higher quality. In order to enhance the 
relevance and usefulness of disclosed information, regulation of risk disclosures should 
ensure that information is regularly updated and more future oriented. The emphasis 
should be on the quality of disclosure about possible future risks rather than just an 
increase in the amount of generic, vague and backward-looking statements which lack of 
usefulness for investors.  
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